top of page
Arnold Kwong

Where is the Data - The Fake Airplane Parts Can Kill Crisis

Updated: Oct 11, 2023

The airplane may crash and kill from bad data


The Crisis Begins


The crisis began with a query about data. Part Number 1856M94P01 Bushing:Shroud may not have approved paperwork. That did not sound like a big problem. Now, the crisis sees airlines grounding almost 100 aircraft for safety. Lawsuits have been filed. Searches for data go on. Regulators fight lawyers as questions continue worldwide.


EkaLore has been analyzing manufacturing supply chains where the data is as important as the parts or supplies. The crisis for airplane parts data has hit the bottom lines of airlines. EkaLore will provide analysis and looks at what this means for manufacturing enterprises selling in global markets. For enterprises in many industries the lessons point to needed changes by governments, manufacturers, and supply chains.


A Portuguese maintenance and repair company, TAP Manutenção e Engenharia, had not been able to confirm the Authorized Release Certificate (ARC) for a CFM jet engine part number 1856M94P01 . The part had been purchased from a UK company AOG Technics (The name is a play on the industry term “Aircraft On Ground”.) AOG Technics claimed to be a parts broker with warehouses worldwide in London, Frankfurt, Miami and Singapore. AOG Technics did distribute parts globally. AOG’s claims of global warehouses and staff appear to be unsupported.


The bad data was on EASA Form 1 and FAA Form 8130-3 that should be supplied for each part. This means the Authorized Release Certificate (ARC) for each such part was deemed falsified. Falsified parts become “Suspect Unapproved Parts” in regulatory language. The regulator notices to airlines were clear in intent(see Background segment for more details of the bad forms and data).


1. Many organizations throughout the maintenance and supply chains were instructed to “investigate their records thoroughly”. Going back to 2015, even organizations with only indirect handling of the suspect parts had to act (parts purchased by someone or somewhere else).

2. A trace for final disposition for each part sold by AOG Technics was desired – in an inventory, discarded, on an airplane, or otherwise in use. TAP raised a question about one part on a Form 8130-3. On follow-up with TAP the manufacturer identified 24 more forged Form 8130-3’s for CFM56 engines. A single Form may list many parts.

3. Airlines/aircraft with the Suspect Unapproved Parts usage must be reported to the regulator.


Airplane operators look at grounded aircraft as holes in their profits where money is poured in. Airplanes grounded for critical parts (bad data), and no schedule for repairs, are a nightmare. And then things got worse.


To see more of EkaLore's Series Where's the Data: The Fake Airplane Parts Can Kill go to


To understand how to manage traceability data in your enterprise contact us at


Recent Posts

See All

Comments


bottom of page