Supply Chains and Logistics of 21st Century War
Prepared by: Arnold Kwong, May 2022, Version 1.3
It is improbable for present-day US/foreign military producers to implement a useful volume production process and deliver requested volumes of old-design Javelin and Stinger missiles in any rapid timeframe. Read on to see what brings us to this conclusion.
Media and lore in war seems to select an iconic weapon reaching the public's imagination. The ongoing Ukrainian conflict has seen the western media herald the use of the US-built Javelin and Stinger missiles. The supply chain and technology issues get less attention. Sustaining battlefield supplies of man portable weapons will require rethinking legacy production and logistics.
Various generals are credited with versions of the quote:
"Amateurs talk about strategy and tactics. Professionals talk about logistics and sustainability in warfare." (Barrow, 1979)
The wisdom descends from Sun Tzu who 2,500 years ago said,
“All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved. … He who can modify his tactics in relation to his opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-born captain. “
In this release key details are considered to illuminate supply chains and technology evolutions.
Ukrainian combatants are using successful tactics creating a demand for more man portable weapons supplies. In turn, this creates political demands for more supplies. Rapid production of more of the same weapons is unlikely due to supply chain considerations, and technological age. Logistical complexity of transporting weapons from existing stockpiles to the frontline battlefields requires critical time and resources.
The Stinger missile production is currently at a tiny production level for Taiwan (ordered 2019, 250 units finishing in 2026). The production rate is so low that 18-24 months are required for a single batch. According to the CEO of Raytheon new production in 2023 or 2024 will require “redesign of some of the electronics in the missile and the seeker head”. The US has not procured any Stinger missiles for 18 years. The Deputy Secretary of Defense has responded that there are now “obsolescence issues”. The Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology responded that “… with enough funding and support… we can accelerate that production…”. The key issues are electronics obsolescence and parts supply.
The chip technology problem is human and technical. The initial design and development of the microprocessor used in the Stinger missile was done in 1983. (To clarify, likely by the grandparents generation of the engineers now called upon for new production.) The human problem is the documentation language and design details will be alien to current-generation engineers and manufacturing. The doctrinal planned tactics uses 40 years ago did not include small drone swarms, UAVs, or loitering munitions of 21st Century battlefields. The reported successes against some newer threats are a credit to common propulsion and vulnerabilities. The human problems drive the needs for weapons system performance from chips and sensors.
The paired chip and sensor technology created a new weapons capability. The technical specifications in 1983 likely called for a then military state-of-the-art 1,000,000 times slower than a smartphone, tablet, or smartwatch. The improvements imply current generation chips with 10,000,000 times the complexity. An Army RFI in 2020 announced, “… the Stinger Missile Reprogrammable Microprocessor (RMP) will become obsolete in fiscal year (FY) 2023…” If there is no inventory of these chips then any new manufactured articles may be labeled “Stinger” while being a very different missile. The lithium batteries and argon supplies in the missiles, designed in the 1990s, last only a few years and have seen ‘hardware hacks’ on the battlefield to maintain use. The Javelins first test flew in 1991 and sees similar issues. The chips and missiles are now fighting vehicles with the same vintage design life. Questions yet unanswered include whether copies of old weapons should be produced, or modified to embrace new tactical demands. Any new production designs will live into a long weapons future.
The supply chain for very old design missiles’ chips is limited to a few specialized production and inventory enterprises. If still existing, identical chip supplies typically come from a warehouse inventory or very limited production. Manufacturing missiles and targeting units is slow and expensive. To replace existing weapons inventory an Army RFI in 2020 called for production of up to 8000 replacement units to begin in 2026 with existing Stingers remaining in use until 2030/2031 (60 years after development began). The last production rates for air attack Stingers (2003) were a maximum of 720 rounds per year with a 2-year procurement lead time. Production rates for the ground-attack Javelin missile were 850 units in FY2021 with about 3700 missiles planned from FY2021-FY2025. This is also limited by maximum production capacity of less than 7000 units/year, contract capacity of 2100 units/year, and out-of-production Javelin components. The Javelins delivered were from production orders placed about 3 years prior. Production of missile warheads and rocket motors are highly concentrated with limited ability to scale production. Supply chain and production bottlenecks will limit acquisition of new missiles.
The current battlefield intergovernmental requests are for up to 1000 man portable weapons per day (500 Stingers and 500 Javelins). Sustaining current or faster combat tempos will create even higher demands. As of this writing 5500 Javelins in 2022 (1500 more in prior years), of a total US Army production of about 38000, have been sent to battle, along with 1400 Stingers. Other countries are reported to have shipped more than 1200 Stingers and Javelins combined. Existing supply is all coming from existing arsenal inventories with countries (and missiles) just beginning the process to back-fill the expended missiles. The inventory of existing weapons will certainly be depleted if conflict lasts any length of time.
Man portable weapon doctrine has radically changed over time. When originally deployed the Redeye missile teams were assigned as a single platoon in a Marine Division. Non-dedicated 2-3 person Stinger teams were stationed on warships against threats beginning the mid-1980s. US Army doctrine as of December 2020 called for one Stinger team per combat Company unit. Current media pictures show small fireteams (of 10-15) in the field carrying 6-10 weapons of multiple types per team. UAVs can carry Stinger missiles. Logistics pictures show entire cargo aircraft dedicated to movement of man portable weapons. Moving even “single shot” launchers from depots to front lines in volume is complex and consumes transport. The successes of actual battlefield use of man portable weapons differ from doctrinal plans with likely expended quantities far exceeding projections.
In summary, it is improbable for present-day US/foreign military producers to implement a useful volume production process and deliver requested volumes of old-design Javelin and Stinger missiles in any rapid timeframe. Even government priorities and funding have hit realities of old ways. Radical changes in combat doctrine and logistics will require manifold changes in military planning, production, and applications. Winning strategies must embrace modified tactics for results.
Next Up - Key Timelines of the Stinger Missile
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