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Arnold Kwong

Where is the Data: The Fake Airplane Parts Can Kill Crisis - Traceability

Tracing Parts, Services, and People


The Fake Airplane Parts Can Kill Crisis looked for records all related to "things". The records sought also looked for "who", "when", "where", and "how" transactions and actions were taken. Inspection, and changes, will result from costs and successes in finding the answers held in the traceability data.


Manufacturing Traceability is defined as the ability to manage the data tracking the manufacturing process including the supply chain, materials, labor steps, process, process changes, testing, and chain of custody for products and their data.


More broadly traceability is the creation, retention, and use of data related to, or about, almost anything.


The definitions and descriptions of the data is often referred to as " metadata". This also describes the sources, uses, and governance of the data. For example, “Data for properly completed GE-sourced USA FAA Form 8130-3 submitted with supply of Part Number 1856M94P01 Bushing:Shroud used in kit for maintenance process per GE/Safran CF6-50 Service Bulletin - 72-1223 R03 SB 72-1223 R03 ENGINE - STAGES 4-14 HPC BLADES (72-00-00) – Improved Performance”, Issued: 03/12/2002 Revised: 06/06/2003, performed by Airline Service Maintenance Group (Certified Mechanic P. Tovs), on October 31, 2023, at CenterField Hanger (non-serialized parts)”.


Manufacturing traceability has long been a feature for manufacturing and defense, aerospace, medical products, drugs, and other very high value goods that require high safety and reliability standards. These high value goods are tracked for recalls just as food products and other consumer products are subject to recalls due to manufacturing problems or contamination. In addition some products are tracked so they can be kept out of improper channels or end uses. Examples include grey market goods, high tech equipment embargoed, and military arms. In recent years traceability has also been used to prove material origins, food certification, and to prevent fake products and goods. For example the subsidies in the new USA Inflation Reduction Act apply to vehicles with manufacturing and components that must be tracked for certain geographies


A manufactured part has a history of its data from initial conception, development, testing, manufacturing, use, retirement, and disposal -- among other steps. Throughout the Product Life Cycle relevant data is created about all the similar "things" and about each specific "thing". Societal expectations of "quality" for "things" like drugs, guns, or food are matched by data collected for processes and services besides "things". Service traceability data counts performance numbers ("how long did you wait for a doctor") to planning data ("an ambulance should be able to reach everyone in 15 minutes") to sports statistics. Expectations are for data to have been gathered, stored, and be accessible for all "things" and "services".


Manufacturing traceability has been in place for more half a century. Electric vehicle manufacturing traceability is a follow-on. For example, in pharmaceutical drug manufacturing the Federal drug Administration in the United States requires very careful tracking on a 'lot basis'. These lot tracking features of traceability are usually performed by specific features in cGMP manufacturing support software and ERP software. Further, the FDA looks at the conformance of the software tracking to meet cGMP expectations. In the American and European defense production very high value weapon systems components are tracked for traceability over a very long life cycle to provide warranty and maintainability over decades. Tracking is also used by manufacturers to limit liability, reduce unapproved sales and uses, and limit losses to fraud and theft.


Traceability is also coming to certain kinds of records with very long life. Healthcare records systems now create individuals' records that will need to exist at least 20 years beyond the life of the individuals. For some purposes, such as future health analytics and prevention, it is assumed that very detailed information for genetics, environmental exposure, and related health information (wellness) will need to be tracked for the life of the individual and beyond. An example is to understand the risk for individuals for exposure, possibly decades past, to chemicals in a work or home place. Biological parent exposures to mutagenic affects (chemicals, radiations, drugs) mean genetic and exposure data may be needed for longer than two-lifetimes.


On a smaller scale, records for individuals use of electronic devices and presence (such as where the cell phone was and when it was turned on) are already features in law enforcement criminal cases. Controversies in many jurisdictions are related to the use of this smart device location data (metadata). Controversy still follows ownership, custody, storage, and protection of traceability data from 5G networks, smart phones, smart devices, IoT, utilities, AI-interactions, and networks of public cameras.


In addition to Manufacturing traceability, the traceability information related to people and everyday things is controversial. For example the privacy impacts of every key press on a smart TV being sent back to the ISP, manufacturer, or entertainment service provider. The traceability information on an individual's financial transactions down to times of day, geographic locations, and the other 'level 3' transaction data is not regarded as private in many situations.


There are many conflicts over traceability data including ownership, right to create, right to destroy, and right to use. For example, the records a car keeps on driving, drivers, car performance, roads and geography, and other drivers are contested in courts worldwide on these issues.


Most people see the reasonable need for manufacturing traceability data. Where the case for all of this other tracking and traceability data is less clear to everyone. The (ab)uses by regulators, law enforcement, insurers, spies, and criminals are fairly clear. This difference of views is clearly present in the current public discussion of the Tik Tok web service in many jurisdictions. Public restrictions on transfer and transmission of traceability data (for profiles and other uses) are found in China, India, EUC, USA, and many other jurisdictions.


The existence of increasing amounts of traceability data is not in doubt. The expectations cross cultural, legal, ethical, religious, and technical realms. The data for possibly lethal drugs, airplane parts, and manufacturing traceability may see simpler arguments where the larger questions of expectations are yet to be resolved.


For additional information about manufacturing, operations, and data see http://www.ekalore.com


For help with your traceability data contact us at http://www.ekalore.com


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