Starting the search for fake parts with who has the data
Parked idle airplanes are a threat to profits. An airplane carrying passengers and freight can make money. Idle aircraft on the ground make no money while still running up bills for parking rentals, financing costs, and at risk of damage such as weather. AOG Technics sold thousands of Suspect Unapproved Parts. Suspect Unapproved Parts can cause crashes and no one wants to fly an airplane with such parts.
The Regulatory Notices from the UK CAA, EU EASA, and US FAA demanded action from airplane operators to immediately identify, act, and notify regulators for Suspect Unapproved Parts from AOG Technics.
AOG Technics should have detailed records of all sales. Using that data individual parts should be able to be tracked to their ultimate disposition. AOG Technics was not cooperative. It claimed in the High Court such cooperation wasn’t necessary as Regulatory Notices told all of the potential customers of possible problems. This shifted the records and parts searches (and costs) out into an industry.
Airlines had to look for supply chain data, maintenance records, and business transactions over a nine-year period. Aircraft move between airlines, financial services, and home maintenance bases. Engines can move between airplanes. The custody of the data usually moves with the engine or airplane. The overall records packages is largely paperwork when moving airplanes between airlines.
Delta Airlines was alerted to problems by one of its jet engine overhaul services. Parts sourced from AOG Technics had been installed “in a small number” of jet engines. The external service provider had performed the query and then notified Delta Airlines. Delta then had to track down where the jet engines were and act to rapidly replace the parts.
GE Aerospace, Pratt&Whitney/Raytheon, and Rolls Royce have all moved to offer maintenance, monitoring, and servicing packages to airlines. In addition to “on the airplane” monitoring (while in flight!) the airlines are offered sophisticated preventative maintenance scheduling and labor services from staff certified by regulators. Parts are normally from “OEM” channels (the same as used for the original manufacturing process). The required regulatory records are maintained in carefully curated computer applications at high levels of detail.
The jet engine manufacturers look to expand their ‘life time’ revenues for their products. Manufacturers accumulate design, operating, and critical masses of data across many engines – more than any single airline. The manufacturers leverage their supply chains and knowledge (data) to lower costs below what airlines can do themselves. Global inventories and operating knowledge can be used to build parts pipelines with greater buffer stocks against a large number of engines. Manufacturers’ service operations have access to the data and physical parts inventories for potential revenues and profits.
CFM’s service operations, providing jet engine repair and overhaul services to operators, found four cases of SUP from AOG Technics that had been installed in 16 jet engines. One case was discovered at CFM Materials, and three more cases were parts sourced by third parties and sent into CFM operations. The manufacturer’s operations thus had SUP with forged documents directly, and indirectly, supply to internal maintenance and repair operations.
Airlines, wanting to reduce expensive labor forces, have taken up these offerings at different levels. Jet airliner users are expanding globally as the generation of baby-boom mechanics has retired in the USA/Europe. Airlines want to reduce their very expensive parts inventories, labor forces, and fixed asset footprints for maintenance bases. The effect of these changes is to split the records on engines – where for many the manufacturer has comprehensive tracking and records, and for others, it’s up to a traditional set of records kept up by the airline (and its service suppliers). The level of detailed data available centrally to an airline also depends on the level of decentralization (and national regulation) of maintenance.
Many airlines use common “back end” software applications to perform the operational and administrative functions needed. Most of these applications were externally developed with some legacy applications dating to prior eras of large transnational enterprises. The key records for engines, dictated by regulatory and operational requirements, will track servicing, key operational history, and servicing decisions. If the engine, or aircraft, transfers operators (due to pandemics, financing, expansion or contraction, or generational change) then the records packages go with to the new operator.
The airlines now, in a crisis, had to answer safety-critical questions for themselves, their customers, and regulators. Yesterday would have been a good time to have answers as employees, media, regulators, and the public asked questions about aircraft safety for many airplanes with only two-engines – where one or both could be at risk.
If the question of Who Has the Data can be answered, then Questions can be asked. See the next segment for details.
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