Finding the Fake Parts and Fake Data
CFM/Safran, during litigation in London’s High Court, has sought records relating to at least 230 parts apparently sourced from AOG Technics. In the defense against the lawsuit AOG’s has presented a legal position of not providing detailed sales records for CF6 and CFM56 parts. The defense maintains there is no need for a burdensome and unnecessary records disclosure as owners and operators were already on notice from regulators.
The initial High Court actions covered just 230 transactions. In practice all of the transactions from 2015-present with AOG Technics will have to be checked with a strong suspicion of forged certifications and fake parts in any of the transactions.
The Suspect Unapproved Parts (regulatory language for Fake Parts) were first identified by comparing the Forms accompanying the parts. The data and format of the Forms didn't match the normal manufacturer's Authorized Release Certificate (ARC). Depending on which regulatory form (UK CAA, EASA, FAA, CAAC) used each ARC could list one, or many, different parts (or subassemblies, or kits). ARC documents cover serialized (parts with an individual serial number) and un-serialized parts (nuts, bolts, gaskets, etc). Each part, no matter how small, has to be accompanied by an ARC and tracked all the way to a final disposition (installed in a jet engine, on a shelf in inventory, in shipping, etc). Each enterprise in the chain of custody for the parts is responsible for obtaining, storing, and passing along the ARC covering the parts. Parts on a single ARC could have been used in multiple engines. These engines could then be on multiple aircraft. The aircraft could be operated by multiple carriers for freight or passenger use.
The specific queries for enterprises up and down the supply chain look like:
Has your company, or your contracted ground jet maintenance services, or parts brokers, done business with AOC Technics?
When were any transactions?
Were the transactions for certified parts or materials (requiring ARC)?
Did you buy any parts still in CF-Series 6, particularly CFM56, engines?
Did you buy any parts for Pratt&Whitney PW4000 or V2500 engines?
Are any of the engines operating on current aircraft?
When can suspected unapproved parts be removed from operating equipment?
The magnitude of the problem can be illustrated with the part initially identified by TAP Manutenção e Engenharia (Portugal). TAP should be lauded for being very careful and quality focused. The Part Number 1856M94P01 Bushing:Shroud, dimensions 0.591 x 0.788 x 0.591 inches, and the related 1856M94P02, are used a total of 220 times in a single CF6. The quantity 220 of Inlet Guide Vane Bushing Shrouds together weigh less than 200 grams. These parts are used in Stages 1 and 2 of the High Pressure Compressor where temperatures, pressures, and stresses can be extreme.
Early results of query processing by CFM indicated the majority of the affected parts were "non-serialized items like bolts, nuts, washers, dampers, seals and bushings." This is a large problem as the Suspect Unapproved Parts could be mixed into legitimate parts during the same engine servicing. Literally all of those class of parts changed during a repair or maintenance procedure would likely need to be replaced depending on their application. The 1856M94P01 Bushing:Shroud, used 220 times in a single CF6 engine, would likely all be replaced since it would likely be impossible to identify what parts in a repair procedure were Approved and which were Unapproved. CFM has indicated that no “life-limited parts”, those normally subject to maintenance after a time interval or operating hours, were found during initial queries. The large number of parts identified so far, using data readily accessible, creates a likelihood for finding “life-limited parts” as more ARC’s are verified and validated going back years.
Each party in the jet engine parts supply chain and operators is now trying to find the forged ARC and the fake parts. When found, the aircraft and engines will be quarantined for use until the parts are replaced. The forged certificates have been found by all levels of enterprises in the supply chain: manufacturer (CFM), airline/operator, outsource repair/maintenance, supply chain broker, and more. The huge costs and monetary damages will never be known altogether. Everyone agrees the costs of verifying the ARC's to detect forgeries could have avoided the high costs now being paid.
Reference: CF6-50 Service Bulletin - 72-1223 R03 SB 72-1223 R03 ENGINE - STAGES 4-14 HPC BLADES (72-00-00) – Improved Performance Issued: 03/12/2002 Revised: 06/06/2003
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